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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to estimate the potential pro-poor bias in the existing
structure of protection in six Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (i.e., whether it
redistributes income from rich to poor households). We also explore the extent to which
the barriers faced by SSA exporters in the rest-of-the-world are biased in favor of poor or
rich household. To this end, we start with a simple agricultural household production
model and propose an extension to include adjustments in labor income associated
with changes in unskilled and skilled wages. We then build indicators that capture
the differences in welfare changes across income levels associated with the elimination
of SSA’s own trade protection, as well as trade protection on SSA’s export bundle by
the rest-of-the-world. Results suggest that SSA’s own trade policy is biased in favor
of poor households. In contrast, the trade policies of SSA’s trading partners tend to
be biased in favor of SSA’s rich households, especially when ad-valorem equivalents of
NTMs are taken into account.
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1 Introduction
Trade liberalization makes some individuals better off and others worse off and this income
redistribution can be systematically biased in favor of or against poor individuals. Reductions
in tariffs and non-tariff barriers, both at home and abroad, affect consumer and producer
prices, which in turn affect household production, household consumption, labor earnings,
and transfers. Since the poor and the rich generally consume different bundles and have
different sources of income, trade policy changes will affect them differently, which may lead
to a systematic bias in trade policy. In this paper, we propose an empirical framework to
measure the pro-poor bias in trade protection and we apply this framework to six countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia,
and Madagascar. The analysis covers the bias of SSA’s own trade policies as well as the bias
associated with market access conditions in the rest-of-the-world. To assess these biases, our
framework relies on very disaggregated trade and trade policy data, which we match with
household level information on sources of income and consumption patterns.
Trade policy is pro-poor if the existing structure of protection benefits poor households
proportionately more than rich households. Note, that this implies that the elimination
of the existing structure of protection is actually pro-rich in the sense that the resulting
percentage change in welfare is larger for rich than for poor households. We thus propose a
simple indicator of pro-poor bias given by the difference between the percentage change in
welfare of the average household in the top and bottom deciles of the income distribution.
A larger index reveals a larger poverty bias in the existing structure of trade protection (i.e.,
a larger redistribution from rich to poor households associated with the existing levels of
protection).
To identify pro-poor trade policies, we need to compute the changes in welfare at the
household level that would be caused by the elimination of the observed levels of trade
protection. We work with a framework where changes in household welfare are approximated
by changes in household real income and where these changes in welfare can be decomposed
into consumption, production and labor income effects (Deaton, 1997; Winters et al., 2004).
Measuring the consumption and production effects is straightforward with information on
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consumption and production shares. Labor income effects, which are potentially very
important because labor earnings represent between 30 and 70 percent of total household
income in our target SSA countries, are harder to measure. In particular, we need to calculate
the share of labor income derived from different types of labor (skilled and unskilled) and to
estimate the responses of the returns of those different types of labor to changes in prices,
i.e., the wage-price elasticities.
The literature has estimated these elasticities by exploiting the time-series variation in
prices and in household surveys. See for instance Nicita (2009) for Mexico, Porto (2006, 2010)
for Argentina, and Ural Marchand (2011) for India. This identification strategy requires
time-series data that is typically unavailable for most Sub-Saharan African countries. To
circumvent this problem, we put forward a framework to estimate wage-price elasticities
based on duality theory. Young’s theorem suggests that the second cross derivatives of the
revenue function (which characterizes the GDP of the country) with respect to good prices
and factor endowments are equal, which implies that the first derivative of factor prices
with respect to good prices (the wage-price elasticities) is equal to the first derivative of
quantities with respect to factor endowments. This is convenient because of the availability
of detailed information on quantities exported and imported at the tariff line level, as well as
data on factor endowments. We can then estimate the impact of changes in the endowment
of unskilled and skilled labor on imported and exported quantities at the six-digit level of
the Harmonized System (HS), which are then equal to the wage-price elasticities at the same
level of disaggregation.
A fundamental advantage of our methodology is that it allows for the estimation of the
responses of wages to price changes of very dissagregated goods. This is impossible in a
framework using household data because of limited degrees of freedom. However, this is
important because trade policy is determined at the tariff line level, and there is significant
variation across tariff lines within industries in terms of both protection levels and production
techniques (i.e., factor intensities). For example, the HS 52 category (“cotton”) includes
products such as “raw cotton, not carded or combed” (HS 520100) and “woven cotton
fabrics with less than 85 percent cotton” (HS 521011). Both production techniques and
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trade protection in these two goods can be very different. For instance, in Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Gambia, and Madagascar, the tariff on raw cotton is half that of
the tariff on woven cotton fabrics. In Ethiopia, the tariff on woven cotton fabrics is three
times larger than the tariff on raw cotton (30 versus 10 percent). In the United States (an
export market for SSA), tariffs on raw cotton are a fifth of the tariffs on woven cotton fabrics,
and the latter is subject to non-tariff barriers (technical regulations). The covariance between
trade protection and production techniques is likely to matter for the impact of changes on
trade policy on skilled and unskilled wages. Aggregation at higher levels than the tariff line
level at which trade policy is determined may lead to aggregation bias that is avoided using
the methodology developed in this paper.
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004), in their review of the empirical literature on trade, income
inequality and poverty, also called for a higher product disaggregation in empirical studies
of the impact of trade on wages. The high product aggregation in household surveys makes
the identification of worker reallocation across very aggregated sectors difficult and thus may
reduce the estimates of the impact of trade reforms on wages. Allowing for these general
equilibrium effects may significantly affect the estimates of the previous literature on trade
and wages which were often undertaken within a partial equilibrium framework at a much
more aggregated level. For an early example of a partial equilibrium approach see Revenga
(1997), and for an early call to introduce general equilibrium effects when analyzing the
impact of trade reforms on wages see Harrison and Hanson (1999).1
Our empirical results suggest that the elimination of SSA’s own trade policies leads to
increases in unskilled wages, and decreases in skilled wages. Since SSA is mostly abundant
in unskilled labor, and thus protection is often granted on imported, skilled-intensive goods,
these results are consistent with the standard Stolper-Samuleson predictions. Nevertheless,
with the exception of Ethiopia, domestic trade policy is biased in favor of poor households.2
This is mainly explained by the production (agricultural sales) channel which, with the
1Note that our approach cannot capture the heterogeneity in wage-price elasticities across worker
characteristics as in Porto (2006, 2010) or Nicita (2009). While they can estimate different impacts for
workers in different regions and with different experience, here we can only capture the heterogeneity across
characteristics for which we have endowment data available across countries and time.
2This implies that the removal of trade barriers will bring relatively larger benefits to rich households.
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exception of Ethiopia, tends to be pro-poor. Indeed, given that agricultural sales tend to
represent a larger share of poor households’ income, the decline in prices associated with the
removal of agricultural protection tends to hurt poor households relatively more than rich
households.
Interestingly, the consumption (or expenditure) channel is neither systematically pro-rich,
nor pro-poor. It varies across countries depending on the correlation between the structure
of protection and consumption patterns among poor and rich households. In four of our six
target countries, the consumption effect is pro-rich suggesting that the removal of protection
will tend to benefit more rich than poor households. Note also that the contribution of the
consumption effect to the pro-poor bias in protection is always smaller (in absolute value)
than the contribution of the production effect.
Contrary to SSA’s own protectionism, the protection of the rest-of-the-world on SSA’s
export bundle tends to be biased in favor of rich households. Indeed, the removal of protection
by the rest-of-the-world will bring larger gains to poor households than to rich households.
This is mainly driven by a pro-rich bias in the production (agricultural sales) channel. The
labor income channel is mildly pro-poor in most countries, which again is consistent with
Stolper-Samuelson type effects.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the analytical
framework used to measure the pro-poor bias of trade policy. Section 3 describes our
three-step empirical methodology for the implementation of the analytical setup. In the first
step, we describe the harmonization of different household surveys to compute budget and
income shares at the household level in each SSA country. In the second step, we measure
the restrictiveness of trade policy in SSA, as well as the restrictiveness of SSA’s trading
partners on exports from SSA. In the last step, we describe our empirical methodology to
estimate the impact that changes in trade policy in SSA and abroad have on wages of skilled
and unskilled workers in SSA. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
3One could explore the impact on social welfare of these redistributional consequences of trade reform
using a framework similar to the one recently put forward by Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (forthcoming)
where a pro-poor bias in the existing structure of trade protection would imply gains from society from the
removal of trade protection that would be smaller than those obtained for an economy with representative
individual.
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2 Pro-Poor Trade Policy
Our measure of the pro-poor bias of trade policy is based on estimates of the differential
impact of trade barriers on the real income of the poor vis-a`-vis the non-poor, or more
generally, on the differential impact of trade on household incomes at different levels of living.
The theoretical framework that we use to derive the welfare impacts of price changes is based
on the standard model introduced by Deaton (1989, 1997) and expanded by Ravallion (1990),
Coello et al. (2011), Porto (2006, 2010) and Nicita (2009). Household h welfare is measured
with the indirect utility function Vh:
(1) Vh = Vh(yh,p),
where yh is household income and p is a vector of good prices. In our analysis, and because
of limitations of our data, we focus on the prices of traded goods (non-traded goods, except
for labor, are not considered here).
Household income is determined in a farm-household model, as in Sign, Squire and Strauss
(1986) or Benjamin (1992). Each household has an endowment of labor, which needs to be
allocated to various possible activities, and of other factors of production, such as land or
assets (assumed for simplicity to be fixed). Households can consume some leisure, work on
their own farm to produce goods to sell to the market, or sell labor off-farm (or purchase labor
in the labor market). Households may also enjoy transfers. Household income is defined as:
(2) yh = wLh +
∑
g
pih,g(p) +Gh + φhT,
where w is the wage rate, Lh is the (net) amount of labor sold in the market by household h,
pih,g are profits obtained from selling good g in the market; Gh are government transfers to
household h not associated with tariff revenue, φh is the share of tariff revenue redistributed
to household h and T =
∑
g tgp
∗
gmg (where p
∗
g is the international price of the good g, mg
is good g imports and tg is good g tariff rate) is the tariff revenue collected over all goods g
subject to tariffs.
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To derive the first order welfare impact of a change in price pi, we need to totally
differentiate (1) and (2). As in most of the literature, we assume that markets are perfect
and complete, so that the principle of separability holds. For our purpose, this implies that
households optimize production and consumption decisions based on market prices and that
these market prices are also the relevant shadow prices faced by households.4 Using Roy’s
identity and Hotelling Lemma, we get
(3) dVh =
∂Vh
∂ ln yh
(−sghd ln pg + θwh εwpgd ln pg + θghd ln pg + θTh d lnT ),
where sgh is the share of good g in the consumption bundle of household h, εwpg is the elasticity
of wages with respect to changes in pg, θ
w
h is the share of household income derived from labor
earnings, θgh is the share of income from sales of the production of good g, and θ
T
h is the share
of tariff revenue accrued by the household. Note that ∂Vh/∂ ln yh is the private marginal
utility of income, which is unobservable. In practice, we ignore this term. Conceptually,
from a policy evaluation standpoint, we care about the social utility of income for different
households (e.g., the poor vis-a`-vis the rich) and not about the private marginal utility
of income (which is instead relevant for individuals).5 This means that, in the empirical
analysis, we focus on the changes in household real income, dy˜gh:
(4) dy˜gh = −sghd ln pg + θwh εwpgd ln pg + θghd ln pg + θTh d lnT.
Our objective in this paper is to measure the different pieces of equation (4) and to use these
estimates to assess the pro-poor bias of trade policy. Before doing this, we begin with a brief
conceptual interpretation of the first order approximation in (4).
Our starting point is the change in prices d ln pg brought about by trade policy. It is clear
that there is a relationship between tariffs and product prices. How this relationship works,
however, is more complicated. One issue is the extent of price transmission from trade policy
to domestic prices. Due to lack of data to estimate these pass-through elasticities, here we
4Benjamin (1992) provides evidence in favor of the separability principle in Indonesia but Jacoby (1993),
for Peru, and Le (2009), for Vietnam, report instead potential failures of this assumption.
5See Deaton (1997).
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will assume perfect price transmission (i.e., unitary elasticities).6 Since there is evidence that
trade policy does not pass-through to prices one to one (Nicita, 2009; Goldberg and Knetter,
1997), we in practice would be overestimating the welfare impact of trade. However, since
in this paper we care about the pro-poor bias (or, more generally, the differential impact at
different income levels) of trade policy, the distributional conflict will be correctly identified.7
The other issue is the price effect of different trade policy. We study both protection at
home, and protection abroad. Protection at home is simply the structure of tariff levied by
each particular country on its imports. Protection abroad refers to market access barriers
(that is, the rest-of-the-world’s trade policies) vis-a`-vis SSA. Both types of trade protection
affect border prices (and thus consumer and producer prices given our unitary pass-through
elasticity assumption) and we compare below the difference in their pro-poor bias. In section
3.2, we explain how we utilize trade and protection data to generate estimates of protection
at home and protection abroad and how we use these estimates to calculate price changes.
The first term on the right hand side of (4) measures the impact of a price change on
expenditures. When prices go up consumers are worse off because their real income declines
(keeping nominal income constant); conversely, consumers are better off when prices decline.
To first order, this effect can be well-approximated with the shares of the budget spent on
good g (sg). To implement this, we need information on those budget shares which can be
retrieved, for example, from household survey data.
The second term is the first order impact of the price change on profits. This term
shows that income increases when the price of a good produced by the household goes up
and decreases when prices decline. To first order, this can be approximated by the share of
income derived from the own-production of this good in total income (θgh). This information
can also be retrieved from the household surveys.
In fact, the major objective of the household survey collection and data work described
6Note that this does not imply that world prices, producer prices and consumer prices are equal, but
simply that there are proportional to each other.
7Unless, of course, the pass-through elasticities are household specific. While they might as well be, if
price transmission depends on regional or individual characteristics, it is extremely difficult to identify that
heterogeneity in our data. A possibility would be to estimate the index within type of regions (rural, urban),
or within type of individuals if price transmission were to systematically vary along one of these dimensions.
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in Section 3 is to extract the budget shares, income shares and labor income shares in
different economic activities. While there are no major difficulties in computing these pieces
of information from the available data, some aggregation procedures will be needed to make
the trade data compatible with the household survey data. We discuss these issues in section
3.1.
The third term on the right-hand side of the welfare impact (4) is the impact of prices
on wage income. The estimation of this term requires, first, estimates of the share of income
derived from labor earnings, which can also be recovered from household surveys. Second,
we need to estimate the wage-price elasticities linking changes in prices with changes in
wages. Conceptually, product prices affect factor prices via adjustments in factor markets.
A higher price of good g causes firms in sector g to expand, and perhaps firms in other
sectors to contract. Stronger demand for labor in expanding sectors increases the demand
for labor and pushes wages up, but weaker demand for labor in contracting sectors pushes
wages down. The final response of wages will depend on the relative size of these impacts. In
section 3.3, we discuss how we estimate these wage-price elasticities in our sample of African
countries, using a methodology that does not require the use of several household surveys
across time.
Finally, the last term in (4) measures changes in household income due to changes in
government transfers brought about by changes in tariff revenue. The way tariff revenue is
distributed back to the household is complex. Instead of monetary transfers, public revenues
supposedly affect households via the consumption of public goods such as education, health
or infrastructure. Measuring these impacts has proved to be extremely difficult in practice.
Alternatively, assuming that households benefit from public transfers that are proportional
to their level of pre-shock income, implies that all households will experience the same
percentage change in total income due to changes in government transfers following changes
in tariff revenue.8 This implies that we could abstract from changes in government transfers
if we adopt a measure of pro-poor bias that is neutral to percentage changes in revenue that
are common to all individuals. This will guide our choice of measure of pro-poor bias below,
8Indeed, under this assumption θTh d lnT = T/(
∑
h yh)d lnT = dT/(
∑
h yh), which does not depend on
h).
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so that we do not have to worry about the last term in (4).
But before turning into a measure of the pro-poor bias in the structure of protection, we
need to have a measure of the welfare change for each household associated with the entire
structure of protection, rather than with the change in the price of a single good. This is
simply done by summing the changes in welfare in (4) over all goods g. Assuming as argued
before that government transfers are proportional to the pre-shock level of income, omitting
changes in transfers, our measure of changes in total household real income is
(5) dy˜h =
∑
g
−sh,gd ln pg +
∑
g
θwh εwpgd ln pg +
∑
g
θihd ln pg +
∑
g
αg.
where αg is the percentage change in government revenue (and therefore transfers) associated
with changes in the price of good g (again note that αg does not depend on h and therefore
is common to all households).
Finally, we measure the pro-poor bias by the welfare differences between rich and
poor households associated with the elimination of both tariff and non-tariff barriers. To
operationalize this idea, we define first a vector of average welfare effects (i.e., real income
changes) at varying level of well-being, ∆W lpce:
(6) ∆W lpce = E[dy˜h| ln pce],
where pce is the per capita expenditure of the household—our definition of well-being. We
then compare the relative magnitudes of ∆W lpce for households at different points of the
spectrum of the (log) per capita expenditure distribution. We define the index as the
difference in the percentage change in real income (welfare) of the average household in
top dr income deciles and the percentage change in real income of the average household in
the bottom dp income deciles:
(7) Pd = E[dy˜h|Qh = dr]− E[dy˜h|Qh = dp],
where Qh is the quintile to which household h belongs to (in terms of its per capita
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expenditure). In the empirical application, we set dr and dp at the top and bottom 40
percent of the income distribution, and then check for robustness using the top and bottom
20 and 10 percent of the income distribution. Several points are worth making. First, Pd
does not depend on the value of
∑
i αg. Second, a positive value of Pd implies that following
the elimination of trade barriers, the percentage change in income for rich households is
larger than for poor households. Thus the trade reform is biased against the poor, as they
will earn relatively less than the rich. This implies that the status-quo (i.e., the existing
trade policy) will tend to be pro-poor when Pd is positive.
In order to check that our measure of pro-poor bias is not missing large changes in
intra-poor or intra-rich income, we estimate equation (6) with standard non-parametric
regression models of the welfare impacts given by (5) on the log of per capita expenditure,
ln pce.9 Then, we inspect plots of these non-parametric regressions. If the regression function
slopes up with d ln pce, we say that the trade policy is pro-poor, as the elimination of
the existing structure of protection will lead to larger welfare changes for rich households.
Conversely, the existing trade policy is pro-rich if it slopes down.
3 Implementing the Formulas
The empirical implementation of the formulas needed to estimate the pro-poor bias of
trade policy, at home and abroad, requires several steps and different sources of data.
Most of our analysis is based on household survey data, which provide the microdata on
budget shares and income shares (including labor income shares) that allow us to estimate
household-specific welfare impacts. Then, we need to match these data with the trade data
that we use to measure protection at home and abroad. This requires first harmonizing the
product disaggregation in the household surveys to a common level, so that our measure of
pro-poor bias is comparable across countries, and then filtering this product disaggregation
into the trade and trade policy classification system (the Harmonized System). Finally,
to estimate the changes in real income at the household level given in (5) we also need to
9Here we ignore the last term in (5) which will only shift uniformly the non-parametric regression.
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estimate wage elasticities with respect to changes in prices. In this section, we undertake each
of these steps in turn, by describing the various types of data used in our analysis and the
concordances we made to match these various datasets. Finally, we discuss the methodology
we developed to estimate wage-price elasticities for skilled and unskilled workers at the tariff
line level.
3.1 The Household Surveys: Budget Shares and Income Shares
We work with household surveys for six Sub-Saharan countries, namely Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, and Madagascar. These countries were chosen
based on data availability and some degree of comparability in the survey’s coverage. The
name of the surveys and some basic characteristics are listed in Table 1. Sample sizes range
from over 25 thousand households in Ethiopia to below 2 thousands in Gambia. The share
of the population residing in rural areas is often high. The highest share is in Burkina Faso
with 69 percent of the population living in rural areas. The lowest is in Cameroon with 35
percent of the population in rural areas.
Table 2 presents demographic summary statistics from the surveys, including total
population, its average age structure, and average years of education of the working
population, at the national level and both in rural and urban areas. As expected, there
is a lot of variation in the total population of the sample countries: 55.5 million live in
Ethiopia, and only 1.8 in Gambia. There are no striking differences in terms of average age
across countries and regions. The African population appears to be young, with average age
of roughly 21-27 years in all countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). African households tend
to be large, especially in rural areas. The average household size is typically higher than
5 members. Finally, formal education (measured by years of education) is low everywhere.
Countries with the highest average number of years of education are Coˆte d’Ivoire and
Gambia, with close to 9 years of education, whereas Burkina Faso and Ethiopia show less
than two years of average education. The level of education is strikingly lower in rural areas.
While all the surveys we work with collect information on incomes and expenditures, they
decompose expenditures and incomes into different sub-categories. This creates a problem
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when trying to build comparable aggregates across surveys. To tackle this issue, we aggregate
both the expenditure and the income in the surveys into a common classification of goods
across countries. To this end, we built “templates” to map the information at the highest level
of disaggregation to the different homogeneous categories (across surveys) that we will use
in the analysis. We used two different templates, one for the standardization of consumption
(and own-consumption) categories, and another one for income standardization.
The expenditure template is in Table 3. There are four levels of disaggregation. The
fourth level, the most detailed one, includes very disaggregated categories, such as corn, wine
and cigarettes. At the third level, these products are aggregated into more comprehensive
categories such as cereals, alcohol and tobacco. Similarly, level 2 includes categories such as
staple-food, non-staple-food and energy, and level 1 includes the most aggregated categories,
such as agriculture, manufacture and services. Finally, a similar template is used for income
standardization, going from very disaggregated categories such as sales of corn, beans, rice,
etc. (level 4), to sales of cereals (level 3), to sales of staple food or non-staple food (level 2),
to sales of agricultural goods (level 1). This template is in Table 4.
The household surveys are useful for us because we need the data on budget and income
shares to calculate the household-specific welfare impacts of trade policy. Tables 5 and 6
report the shares of income earned in different economic activities (at level 1) and various
expenditure shares (also at level 1) for the top and bottom 40 percent of the income
distribution. We only report the shares of income and expenditure that are related to
trade policy. For example, autoconsumption, services expenditures or incomes, etc., are not
included in these totals. The sum of the columns gives an idea of the share of income and
expenditure that is likely to be affected by trade policy. Not surprisingly, a large share of
the income of African households at the bottom of the income distribution comes from sales
of agriculture goods and from unskilled labor income, and very little from skilled labor.10
At the top of the income distribution, while sales and unskilled labor income are still the
dominant source of income, skilled labor takes a significantly larger share. In Cameroon, for
instance, the share of skilled labor in total income of the rich reaches almost 20 percent.
10A worker is defined as skilled if he has more than 9 years of education.
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Household expenditures are, for the most part, allocated to food consumption both at
the bottom and the top of the income distribution (see Table 6). Expenditure on other goods
which prices can be changed by trade policy reforms never represents more than 21 percent
of total expenditure by either bottom or top income quintile households. The largest share
is found among rich households in Ethiopia.
3.2 Trade and Protection Data: Trade Policy and Price Changes
Turning to trade and protection data, the import and export data are from United Nation’s
Comtrade. Trade flows are available at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS-6)
for the year 2006. Trade policy data, including information on tariffs and non-tariff barriers
is drawn from Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009). This information is also available at the
HS-6 digit level. The data on ad-valorem equivalents of NTBs are available for most of the
large developed markets such as the US, the EU, Japan, and Canada (although only for
the year 2001). Except for Coˆte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, data on NTBs for our target
countries is not very comprehensive.
For the purpose of building the indicator of pro-poor bias in trade policy, we need
to convert the trade and trade policy information into the classification of goods and
activities that we created to harmonize the household surveys. To do this, we constructed
a concordance that converts HS 6-digit lines into our standardized household survey
classification. The concordances are cumbersome but straightforward.11 Filtering the trade
data (imports and exports) is simple as we just need to add up the different components
within a given category (similar to what we did with the household survey data). However,
the trade policy aggregation is much more complex because of two major aggregation hurdles
that arise when measuring trade restrictiveness: aggregation of different forms of trade
policies, and aggregation across goods with different economic importance.
The first aggregation problem arises because trade policy can take many different
forms: tariffs, quotas, non-automatic licensing, antidumping duties, technical regulations,
monopolistic measures, subsidies, and so on. This first aggregation problem is solved using
11And they are available from the authors upon request.
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the ad-valorem equivalents of non-tariff barriers estimates of Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga
(2009) that are obtained by first estimating the impact of non-tariff barriers on quantities
imported and then transforming the quantity impact into a price-equivalent using import
demand elasticities.
The second aggregation problem arises when one wants to aggregate trade protection
which is set at a very detailed level into some composite good (the product categories
described in Tables 3 and 4). Commonly used aggregation procedures, such as simple
averages, import-weighted averages and frequency or coverage ratios, do not have a sound
theoretical basis. For example, imports subject to high protection rates are likely to be small,
and therefore, will be attributed small weights in an import-weighted aggregation. This
would underestimate the restrictiveness of those tariffs. Also, the lack of a sound theoretical
basis may lead to strange results. For example, the contribution to the import-weighted
average of goods subject to prohibitively high tariffs is the same as the contribution of
goods subject to zero tariffs. Indeed, none of these goods affect the import weighted-average
(for a given level of aggregate imports). Also, when computing simple average tariffs, very
low tariffs on economically meaningless goods would downward bias this measure of trade
restrictiveness.
To tackle these problems, we follow Anderson and Neary (2005) and the empirical
extension in Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) to create measures of trade restrictiveness,
which include both tariffs and non-tariff barriers at different levels of our homogeneous
classification of goods. More specifically, to measure the effect of a given country’s trade
policies on its domestic prices, we use the tariff trade restrictiveness index (TTRI) and the
overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI). The difference between the TTRI and OTRI
is that the OTRI includes the effect of both tariff and non-tariff measures (NTM), while
the TTRI measures only the effect of tariffs. Both the TTRI and the OTRI represent the
uniform tariff equivalent that would keep aggregate imports constant within a composite of
the new classification of goods in the standardized household surveys. They are calculated
as a weighted average of the levels of protection at the 6-digit of the harmonized system
using import values and import demand elasticities as weights. By taking into account the
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elasticity of import demand with respect to prices, we give relatively more weight within
the new composite to six-digit goods with a more sensitive import demand (those goods
for which smaller movements in prices produce larger shifts in imports). TTRI and OTRI
are calculated at different levels of the new homogenous classification of goods described in
Tables 3-4.
Formally, we define the tariff trade restrictiveness index (TTRI) as:
(8) TTRIi,g =
∑
x,nεg
ti,x,n
mi,x,nηi,n∑
x,nεgmi,x,nηi,n
,
where i denotes the importing country for which we are calculating the TTRI, g is the
composite good which includes a subset of goods n at the HS-6 digit level, and x identifies the
exporting partner country from which country i is importing. ti,x,n is the tariff that importing
country i imposes on imports of six digit HS product n from the exporting country x; mi,x,n
are imports of six digit HS product n of country i from country x; and ηi,n is the import
demand elasticity of product n in country i. Import demand elasticities were borrowed from
Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008).
The OTRI is calculated in the same way but instead of using only tariffs, we use the sum
of tariffs and ad-valorem equivalents of NTM provided by Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009).
To estimate the welfare effects of trade protection, we need to transform TTRI and
OTRI into price changes. For TTRI, assuming perfect transmission of tariff changes to
domestic prices, we have:
(9) ∆ ln pg =
∆TTRIg
1 + TTRIg
=
−TTRIg
1 + TTRIg
,
where the last equality follows from the assumption of full elimination of tariffs (so that
∆TTRIg = −TTRIg). A similar expression can be derived for OTRI. These measures
capture the price changes caused by each country’s own trade policy on good g.
We are also interested in estimating the pro-poor bias of protection abroad. To calculate
the price changes brought about by this type of protection, we assume that the target
countries face bilateral preferences with their trade partners and that they are small in
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world trade. Both assumptions are plausible. First, the African countries in our sample
are indeed small in world trade and thus are unlikely to affect international prices. Second,
most African countries have enjoyed some type of preferential access to major markets in
the developed world via GSP, AGOA, EBAs, EPAs, and so on. Our assumptions imply that
we can approximate the changes in the domestic price one to one with the change in foreign
market access (i.e., the change in tariffs abroad is directly reflected in domestic prices).12
First, we estimate indices of the trade restrictiveness imposed by the rest-of-the-world
on each country’s export bundle at the different level of disaggregation of our homogenous
goods classification. As in the case of “own” trade policies, we build two indices, labeled
as the MA-TTRI and the MA-OTRI where MA stands for market access. More formally,
MA-TTRI is given by:
(10) MA-TTRIi,g =
∑
x,nεg
ti,x,n
ei,x,nηi,n∑
x,nεg ei,x,nηi,n
,
where the subscripts are defined as before, but the tariff and the import demand elasticity
are now those of the partner country and ei,x,n are the exports of HS–g for goods, n for
goods at the tariff line level within each good g, i for the exporting country in SSA, and x
for the destination country. That is, the MA–TTRI is the average tariffs that an aggregated
good g (composed of products n) originating from country i face when exported to x. The
MA–OTRI is calculated in the same way, but instead of using tariffs in the rest-of-the-world,
we used the sum of tariffs and ad-valorem equivalents of NTMs in the rest-of-the-world.
Once we have estimates of MA-TTRIg, we calculate the price change of good g under a
unitary pass-through elasticity assumption. The trade policy scenario that we study is the
full elimination of protection on SSA’s export bundle, or in other words, a situation where
12Abandoning these assumptions would require us to estimate the impact that the trade policy of every
country in the world has on world prices, and this would involve having a model for the functioning of world
markets. See Hoekman and Olarreaga (2008) for an illustration of such a model with applications to various
countries around the world.
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the MA-TTRIg goes to zero. In consequence, the price change is given by:
13
(11) ∆ ln pg =
∆MA-TTRIg
1 +MA-TTRIg
=
MA-TTRIg
1 +MA-TTRIg
.
This measure captures the percentage change in prices faced by producers if protection
abroad on goods exported by African countries were to be eliminated. We also calculate
price changes using the protection implied by the MA-OTRIg index. Note that the sums in
(10) and for MA-OTRI are done over all trading partners, but they can easily be decomposed
to assess the impact of the most important trading partners.
Table 7 provides the values of MA-OTRI, MA-TTRI, OTRI and TTRI for all goods,
for agriculture and food products, and for other goods. Interestingly, for most African
countries, the level of trade restrictiveness faced on their exports by the trade policies of the
rest-of-the-world is larger than the level of trade restrictiveness they impose on their imports.
This is mainly driven by non-tariff barriers, in particular non-tariff barriers imposed on their
exports of agricultural and food products.14 Overall, the measure of trade restrictiveness
shows quite a bit of heterogeneity even at this level of aggregation which suggests that
different countries may be affected differently by trade reforms at home and abroad. For
instance, Coˆte d’Ivoire has the highest OTRI for own protection, at around 17 percent.
Note that this is partly due to the quality of its NTM data relative to other countries.
Indeed, Coˆte d’Ivoire has the lowest level of TTRI restrictiveness (tariffs only). SSA’s own
protection tends also to be higher in agricultural and food products (except in Gambia and
Madagascar), but when it is higher the differences between the level of restrictiveness between
agriculture and other goods is much smaller than the differences in trade restrictiveness faced
by SSA exporters in the rest-of-the-world. The trade restrictiveness faced by Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Ethiopia and Madagascar in the rest-of-the-world jumps from less than 3 percent to around
20 percent once we include measures of the restrictiveness of non-tariff barriers faced abroad.
13Assuming as mentioned above that protection in the rest-of-the-world on goods imported from elsewhere
is unchanged and that these SSA countries are not too large to satisfy demand in any of rest-of-the-world
countries at existing domestic prices.
14Note that the measures of non-tariff barriers for SSA are not available for all products and all SSA
countries.
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Cameroon is the least affected by protection abroad with an average restrictiveness captured
by MA-OTRI at 9 percent. All other countries face levels of protection of around 20 percent.
This is mainly driven by Agricultural and Food, which bear levels of protection that are
generally 5 or 6 times larger than the levels of protection faced in manufacturing. The very
high levels of protection faced abroad in agriculture and food are again mainly driven by
NTMs. In other goods NTMs play a role but its overall impact is much smaller.
3.3 The Wage-Price Elasticities
The “wage-price elasticities”, the change in wages in response to changes in prices, are key
parameters of the pro-poor bias of trade policy given by equation (5). In the literature,
these elasticities are typically recovered by exploiting either the time series variation or the
regional variation in prices and wages (Deaton, 1997; Nicita, 2009; Porto, 2006; Porto, 2010;
Ravallion, 1990). In the case of SSA, this information is, however, not available. For this
reason, here we propose a method to estimate price elasticities of labor income that does
not require datasets with time variation in wages and prices. This is a novel method to
estimate the price elasticity of wages and it is one of the main contributions of our paper. It
utilizes data that is readily available and is thus much more accessible than the time-series
or regional data used so far. In addition, our method allows for the estimation of wage-price
elasticities at the 6-digit level of the HS. This rich heterogeneity will allow us, in turn, to
exploit the detailed microdata in the household surveys when computing the pro-poor bias
of trade policy.
The model, which builds on the GDP (or revenue) function approach, is based on Kee,
Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) adaptation of Kohli (1991) and Harrigan (1997) setup. We
assume that the GDP function is common across all countries up to a country-specific term,
which controls for country productivity differences. Let G(p;v) be this well defined GDP
function, which depends on a vector of prices for goods (p) and endowments (v). G(p;v)
is twice differentiable and it is convex in p and concave in v. Then by Young’s theorem we
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have that:
(12)
∂2G
∂pnvm
=
∂2G
∂vmpn
,
where pn is price of good n (at the HS 6-digit tariff line level) and vm is factor endowment
m. By the envelope theorem we know that ∂G/∂pn = qn, where qn are quantities of good n,
and ∂G/∂vm = wm , where wm is the price of factor endowment m. Thus, we have:
(13)
∂qn
∂vm
=
∂wm
∂pn
.
The left-hand-side of equation (13) is the Rybczynski effect: it measures the change in output
at the product level for a given change in factor endowments; the right-hand-side is what
we are after, i.e., the change in wages following a given change in prices. To capture the
important variance in trade policy at the tariff line level, we would like to estimate these wage
elasticities at the most disaggregated possible level. Thus, instead of working with production
data as in Harrigan (1997), we adopt the Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008) approach and use
imported goods instead, assuming that they are inputs to the production of other goods. In
the case of exported goods, we assume that they are imperfect substitutes to domestically
produced goods (i.e., qn will appear with a negative sign in the GDP function when the
good is imported—as all imported goods are assumed to be inputs into the production
process,—and a positive sign when we are estimating the reaction of wages to exported
prices, or rather exports to changes in labor endowment).
To implement the above GDP function empirically, we approximate G(p;v) with a
flexible translog functional form with respect to prices and endowments:
lnG(p,v) = a00 +
∑
n
a0n ln pn +
1
2
∑
n
∑
k
ank ln pn ln pk +(14)
+
∑
m
b0n ln vm +
1
2
∑
m
∑
λ
bmλ ln vm ln vλ +
∑
n
∑
m
cnm ln pn ln vm,
where a, b and c are the translog parameters, and subscript k (like n) is for six-digit HS
goods. Ensuring that the GDP function satisfies all the classic homogeneity and symmetry
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restrictions, the derivative of the GDP function with respect to prices yields the share of
good n (and imported or exported good in our case) in GDP:
(15) sn =
pnqn
GDP
= a0n + ann ln pn +
∑
k 6=n
ank ln pk +
∑
m
cnm ln vm.
Our parameter of interest is cnm which captures the Rybczynski effect of changes in factor
endowment m on imports (or exports) of good n. The derivative of sn with respect to factor
endowment vm is given by:
(16)
∂sn
∂vm
=
pn
G
∂qn
∂vm
− sn
G
∂G
∂vm
= cnm
1
vm
Solving the last equality for ∂qn/∂vm, and noting that by the envelope theorem ∂G/∂vm =
wm, yields:
(17)
∂qn
∂vm
=
1
pn
[
cnm
G
∂vm
+ snwm
]
=
wm
pn
[
cnm
sm
+ sn
]
,
where sm is the share of factor income m in GDP. Since ∂qn/∂vm = ∂wm/∂pn, it follows that
the elasticity of the wage of factor m with respect to prices of good n is given by:
(18) εwmpn =
cnm
sm
+ sn.
Thus with data on the share of good n in GDP (which is nonpositive for imported goods
and positive for exported goods) which we take from United Nation’s Comtrade, and on
the share of unskilled labor and skilled labor income in GDP (which is drawn from the
household surveys), as well as an estimate of cnm, we can then provide our estimate of the
price elasticity of unskilled and skilled wages for different 6-digit HS goods.
Note that cnm (the parameter of the GDP function) can be positive or negative depending
on good n factor intensity, but its value and sign is common across all countries. When cnm
is positive, this implies that an increase in the labor endowment (vm) will lead to a reduction
in imports of good n (given that sn is negative when considering imports). This implies that
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good n is labor intensive. However, the wage elasticity will vary by country according to
each country’s labor abundance and the importance of imports of good n in GDP.
To obtain values for cnm, we estimate equation (15) for both imports and exports of each
HS-6 digit good assuming that all goods imported or exported are homogeneous. This allows
us to replace the world price of each HS-6 digit good by a year dummy (given that we estimate
these equations for each HS-6 digit good separately). Given that the share equation in (15)
depends on domestic prices and not on world prices, we also introduce country dummies
to control for what we assume is time invariant trade policies which will affect domestic
prices.15 We do not directly introduce trade policy because the available time series are only
available for a few countries before the late 1990, and even fewer are located in SSA. We
then introduce as factor endowments capital, arable land, unskilled labor and skilled labor.
Arable land is from the World Development Indicators. Capital is constructed from World
Development Indicators’ investment data using the permanent inventory method. Skill and
unskilled labor data is from the Barro and Lee database. Endowment variables are divided
by land, to ensure constant returns to scale. The sample spans from 1988 when the HS was
introduced to 2009, and covers all six SSA countries.
Thus, we estimate cnm across countries (i) for each HS-6 digit good n with ordinary least
squares using the following specification first for exports and then for imported goods:
(19) si,t = ai + at +
∑
m
cnm ln vm,i,t + εi,t.
And then use (18) to compute the price elasticities of wages for unskilled labor and skilled
labor for both exported and imported goods. The average elasticities for changes in export
and imported prices at the six digit of the HS for each country are given in Table 8. All
average elasticities are negative and very small, but this hides some significant variation
across goods and within countries, as shown by the very large standard deviation relative to
the mean elasticity in each country. The fact that the average elasticity is very small is to
be expected as we are considering changes in prices of goods at the six digit of the HS. The
15See Harrigan (1997) for similar assumptions when estimating Rybczynski elasticities.
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average share of imports and exports of an HS 6 digit good in the economy is very small,
and therefore changes in their prices should only lead to small changes in wages.
Interestingly the correlation between unskilled and skilled wage elasticities is equal to
-0.54 (both on the export and import side), and statistically significant at the 1 percent
level. This means that when the elasticity of unskilled wages increases when moving from
one HS 6-digit good to another, the elasticity of skilled wages tend to fall. This suggests
that skilled and unskilled wages are likely to move in opposite direction in the presence of
trade reforms.
We can also check the share of “natural enemies” as defined by Jones and Scheinkman
(1977). A natural enemy of unskilled labor, for example, is a good for which the price
elasticity of unskilled wages is negative. That is, when the price of that good increases
(through trade policy for example), the price of unskilled labor falls. Among imported
goods, on average 58 percent of HS 6-digit goods are natural enemies of unskilled labor; it
varies between 55 percent in Cameroon and 60 percent in Gambia. And only 45 percent of
HS 6-digit imported goods are natural enemies of skilled labor; it varies between 43 percent
in Coˆte d’Ivoire and 46 percent in Ethiopia.
More importantly, we are not interested in the price elasticities of wages per se, but
rather in how the elimination of all trade protection would affect unskilled and skilled wages
(third term in equation (5)). We then compute:
(20) ŵ =
∑
g
εwpgd ln pg,
The percentage change in (unskilled or skilled) wages is simply given by the sum across
all goods of the product of price elasticities of wages and price changes associated with
the elimination of trade protection. To capture the elimination of home protection, we
make d ln pg equal to −TTRIg/(1 + TTRIg) or −OTRIg/(1 + OTRIg) and we use the
price-wage elasticities estimated using import data. If we were to consider the elimination
of protection abroad we need to replace TTRI and OTRI by MA-TTRI and MA-OTRI,
and the price-wage elasticities would need to be replaced by the ones estimated using export
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data and equation (19). Thus, the set of goods over which the sum is taken depends on
whether we are considering protection at home or protection abroad.
Results for the estimation of the percentage change in unskilled and skilled wages that
would follow the elimination of existing levels of trade protection at home and abroad are
reported in Table 9. They show that the impact of the restrictiveness of SSA’s own trade
policy on wages seems to be more important than the impact of the restrictiveness of the
rest-of-the-world trade policies on SSA’s wages. The average percentage change in wages is
much larger when looking at SSA’s own trade policy. This may seem surprising given that
overall levels of protection faced by SSA exporters are higher than the levels of protection
at home, as can be seen in Table 7. But this finding can be partly explained by the fact
that wage elasticities estimated with import data are higher than those estimated with
export data. In turn, this is because exports tend to be concentrated in the agricultural
sector, and employment may be less sensitive to variations in agricultural prices than in
manufacturing prices for technology reasons. Another explanation is that the covariance
between domestic trade policy and the wage elasticities is higher than the covariance
between the rest-of-the-world trade policies and the wage elasticities due to political economy
considerations. Indeed, domestic tariffs may be chosen in order to maximize the impact on
domestic overall wages for political reasons leading to a strong correlation between levels of
protection and the sensitivity of wages to changes in prices. This mechanism is absent in
the case of rest-of-the-world protection, which is determined by political economy factors in
foreign countries.
More interestingly, we found strong Stolper-Samuelson type effects associated with SSA’s
own trade policy. That is, the elimination of SSA’s trade protection would lead to a relative
increase in unskilled wages. In other words, the existing structure of protection in SSA
favors skilled over unskilled workers. This is in part because import-competing sectors tend
to be relatively more skilled-intensive in SSA for comparative-advantage reasons, and in
part because the political economy of SSA countries may tend to be biased in favor of
skilled-workers. This is contrary to what was found by Hanson and Harrison (1999) for
Mexico, where protection before the 1985 reforms tended to be biased in favor of unskilled
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workers, but one important difference between Mexico in 1985 and the six SSA countries
in our sample is the degree of democracy. The influence of political economy forces on the
structure of protection may well depend on the extent to which voter’s preferences are in
policymaker’s decisions.16
More generally, the result that the elimination of trade protection leads to an increase
in unskilled wages is somehow at odds with most of the existing empirical literature on
the impact of trade liberalization on wages in developing countries, which shows that tariff
liberalization leads to relative increases in skilled wages (Galiani and Sanguinetti, 2003,
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, 2005 and 2007, Revenga, 1997 or Robertson, 2004). Note that
there are some important exceptions such as Gonzaga, Menezes Filho and Terra (2006) who
found Stolper-Samuelson effects in Brazil after controlling for the relative size of the import
competing sector. And Galiani and Porto (2010) recently found Stolper-Samuelson effects
in Argentina’s trade reforms after introducing general equilibrium type effects in a literature
which has previously mainly identified the impact of trade protection on wages by exploring
the correlations at the industry level. Their general equilibrium result are consistent with
what we obtained for the six SSA countries in our sample within a very different framework,
but which also allows for general equilibrium effects.17
When it comes to the impact of rest-of-the-world’s trade policy on SSA’s wages, effects
are smaller, and do not necessarily tend to show Stolper-Samuelson type effects with only
half of the countries experiencing an increase in the ratio of unskilled to skilled wages when
the rest-of-the-world eliminates the trade restrictions it imposes on SSA’s export bundle.
This more ambiguous result on the export side could be partly explained by the fact that
price shocks to which SSA exporters are exposed reflect the structure of protection in the
rest-of-the-world, which may tend to protect more skilled jobs, and therefore may benefit
skilled workers more than what would have been expected by a simple Stolper-Samuelson
prediction.
16See for example, Milner and Kubota (2005).
17Other explanations for the lack of impact of trade reforms on wages and employment, or an increase in the
relative wage of skilled workers in countries which are unskilled labor abundant have to do with simultaneous
capital account liberalization or opening to foreign direct investment. See for example, Feenstra and Hanson
(1997) who argued that labor demand of foreign firms in Mexico tends to be biased towards skilled workers.
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4 Results
We first discuss the results obtained using the index of pro-poor bias, and then turn to the
non parametric regression of changes in household welfare and household income. We always
start presenting the evidence regarding the changes in welfare following the elimination of
each SSA country’s own trade policy and then turn to the impact following the elimination
of ROW’s trade policy on each SSA country’s export bundle. We also distinguish between
changes following the elimination of tariffs only (TTRI and MA-TTRI), and the elimination
of both tariffs and NTMs (OTRI and MA-OTRI).
Table 10 shows the results of the computation of the index of pro-poor bias given by
equation (7) associated with the elimination of both tariffs and NTM. The index is computed
by taking the difference in average welfare at the top and bottom 40 percent of the income
distribution. We later check the robustness of results for the top and bottom 20 and 10
percent of the income distribution. The first four columns show the index associated with
the elimination of each SSA country’s own trade policy. The last three columns show the
index associated with the elimination of trade barriers imposed by the rest-of-the-world on
SSA’s export bundle. In the case of own trade policies, the first column, labeled overall,
provides the value of the index of pro-poor bias, and the following three columns decompose
the overall impact into an expenditure, sales and wage effect as in (??). In the case of
rest-of-the-world’s trade policies, the first column provides the value of the index of pro-poor
bias, and the following two columns provide the decomposition into sales and wages effects.18
Let us recall that a positive value indicates that the elimination of trade barriers benefited
more rich households than poor households. In other words, the existing trade policy is
pro-poor, as removing it leads to a larger increase in the income of households at the top
of the income distribution. A negative value, on the other hand, indicates that the existing
18In the case of rest-of-the-world’s trade policies, there is no expenditure effect, because as discussed in
the previous section we assume that the improvement in market access is preferential and therefore only
producer prices are affected by the elimination of trade barriers on each SSA country export bundle. Indeed
when a large partner provides preferential access to domestic producers this only affects the price received
by producers, but leaves consumer prices unchanged (see Richardson, 1995). The latter are still determined
by the unchanged world price and the unchanged domestic trade barrier if any. In any case, if we were to
include the consumption effect when computing the pro-poor bias for trade policies in the rest-of-the-world
the correlation with the results reported in Table 10 is around 0.70.
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trade policy is pro-rich.
In interpreting these indexes, keep in mind that they combine, in each country, the
patterns of income shares (from Table 5) and expenditure shares (from Table 6) with the
structure of protection (from Table 7). In consequence, it is in principle not possible to
decompose which part of the index is due to expenditure and income structure and which
to tariff protection structure. It is the covariance between the structure of protection and
consumption and income shares that drives the contribution of each element to the index.19
In all countries the index takes a positive value, indicating that the existing trade
policy has a pro-poor bias, except in Ethiopia. The elimination of the existing structure
of protection would bring larger benefits to rich households than to poor households. The
largest pro-poor bias is to be found in Gambia, where the elimination of the existing trade
barriers would bring a change in rich households’ income which is 4.72 percentage points
larger than the change in the real income of poor households. Only Ethiopia shows a mild
pro-rich bias with the change in rich households’ income being less than half a percentage
point smaller than the change in the real income of poor households. In all countries
the index is driven by the production effect (agricultural sales channel), which is strongly
pro-poor, except in Ethiopia. The contribution of the labor income channel (wages) on the
pro-poor bias index is relatively small, even though it is always negative, suggesting that
existing trade policy tends to be pro-rich through this channel. Again, this is consistent
with Stolper-Samuelson type effects. The fact that the contribution of the labor income
channel to the overall indicator is relatively modest, in spite of the strong Stolper-Samuelson
wage effects reported in Table 9, can be partly explained by the fact that the share of
unskilled labor income at the top 40 percent of the income distribution is quite similar to
the share at the bottom 40 percent, whereas there are larger differences in agricultural sales
and consumption shares (see Table 5).
Indeed the pro-rich bias of the existing trade policies through the labor income channel is
more than compensated in most countries by a strong pro-poor bias through the agricultural
19It is straightforward to show that the indicator of pro-poor bias is given by the covariance of the
structure of protection with the net “sales” of rich and poor households, where net “sales” are determined
as the difference in between income and expenditure of rich and poor households on each good.
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sales channel. In other words, in most SSA countries the elimination of their trade protection
would redistribute income towards poor households through the labor income channel, but
redistribute income away from poor households through the agricultural sales channel. The
only exception is Ethiopia where there is a small pro-rich bias through the agricultural sales
channel, which complements the pro-rich bias through the labor income channel.
The contribution of the consumption channel to the pro-poor index is ambiguous. The
consumption effect tends to be pro-poor in Burkina-Faso and Gambia, but pro-rich in the
other four countries. This is partly explained by the fact that a large share of the expenditure
of poor households is not affected by trade reforms (autoconsumption for example). More
importantly, the production effect is always larger (in absolute value) than the consumption
effect, suggesting again that the overall index is dominated by the production effect, which
is pro-poor, except in Ethiopia.
When it comes to the trade barriers that the rest-of-the-world imposes on SSA export
bundle, in four of the six countries the index takes a negative value, suggesting that the
elimination of rest-of-the-world’s trade barriers on SSA exports would tend to benefit more
poor than rich households. There is therefore a pro-rich bias in the existing trade policy of
the rest-of-the-world. The exceptions are Burkina Faso and Ethiopia where existing rest-of
the-world’s trade policies tend to have a pro-poor bias. The values of the index are mainly
driven by household agricultural sales again, as the wage effect does not seem to be very
different across rich and poor households.
Table 11 provides the same computations but using tariffs only. The indices tend to
have the same sign as before and are generally smaller, simply reflecting that the distortions
introduced by tariffs are obviously smaller than the distortions induced by both tariffs and
NTMs. This is particularly the case for trade policies imposed by the rest-of-the-world.
Indeed, most SSA countries enjoy duty free access to their trading partners markets either
through regional agreements or unilateral preferences granted by most developed countries
under GSP type schemes, such as Everything But Arms or AGOA. These schemes, however,
for the most part do not address non-tariff barriers, and results in Table 10 tend to suggest
that these are generally biased against poor households.
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As a robustness check we also compute the overall pro-poor bias index for the top and
bottom 20 and 10 percent. Results are reported in Table 12. The first three columns report
the value of the index for the elimination of own trade policies, and the last three columns
the value of the index for the elimination of rest-of-the-world’s trade policies on SSA’s export
bundle. The signs of the pro-poor bias indices are identical regardless of whether we take a
40, 20 or 10 percent threshold, with the exception of Gambia and its partners’ trade policies,
where the index increases marginally but changes sign, and of Coˆte d’Ivoire’s own trade
policies which also changes signs when we take a 10 percent criteria). The value of the
index tends to increase (although not always) as we move towards the extreme of the income
distribution, but the differences are generally not very large.
Because of these few changes in signs in Table 12, we check whether our index of pro-poor
bias misses some interesting heterogeneity within rich and poor households, that could be
illustrated with plots of non-parametric regressions of household income on changes in real
income following the elimination of each SSA country’s own trade policy or the elimination
of the rest-of-the-world’s trade barriers on their export bundle. Figure 1 provides these
plots by country. A negative slope for the non-parametric regressions suggests that the poor
benefit more than the rich from the elimination of the existing trade policy, and therefore the
existing trade policy is pro-rich. A positive slope suggests that the rich benefit more than
the poor from the elimination of the existing trade policy, and therefore the existing trade
policy is pro-poor. The local regressions are estimated for changes in real income following
the elimination of both tariffs and NTMs. We also report the non-parametric estimation of
income distribution in each of these countries to assess the relative importance of some of
the non-monotonicities in the two non-parametric regressions.
Results broadly confirmed the results reported in Tables 10 and 12. In Gambia the strong
pro-poor bias of their trade policy is also confirmed by a monotonically increasing curve. In
Coˆte d’Ivoire the pro-poor bias is also confirmed, but the relationship is non-monotonic,
and peaks for middle income households who experience the largest increases in household
income following the removal of their own protection, explaining the change in sign for own
trade policy observed in Table 12 There are also some non-monotonicities in Ethiopia and
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Burkina Faso.
5 Conclusions
Trade reforms affect different households differently, depending on individual preferences and
factor endowments. This paper disentangles the impact of trade policy reforms on SSA’s
poor households. To this end, we start with a simple but well established framework (Winters
et al., 2004) and propose an extension to include adjustments in labor income, that does not
require time series of household data.
Our objective is to measure the potential pro-poor bias in the trade policy of six SSA
countries, as well as in the trade policies of their trading partners. Our index of pro-poor
bias is given by the difference in the percentage welfare changes for rich and poor households
associated with the elimination of trade barriers. A large and positive value of the index
indicates that rich households tend to benefit more from the removal of trade barriers than
poor households in percentage terms, and therefore it is an indication of a pro-poor bias in
existing trade policies. Similarly, a negative value indicates that the poor benefit relatively
more than the rich from the elimination of trade barriers and therefore is an indication of
a pro-rich bias in the existing structure of protection. We calculate these indices for two
different shocks: first, the elimination of SSA’s own trade policies, and then the elimination
of trade policies by SSA’s trading partners.
Results suggest that SSA’s own trade policies are pro-poor, with the exception of Ethiopia
whose trade policy shows a mild pro-rich bias. The countries with the strongest pro-poor bias
in their existing structure of trade protection are Gambia and Coˆte d’Ivoire. On the other
hand, the elimination of trade polices imposed by SSA’s trading partners on SSA export
bundle tends to be pro-rich. Removing the protection in the rest-of-the-world will bring
larger increases in welfare for poor than rich households in all countries, except Ethiopia and
Burkina-Faso. In the case of rest-of-the-world’s trade polices, the effects are mainly driven
by non-tariff measures in the rest-of-the-world, partly because most SSA countries benefit
from generous tariff preferences in their main export markets. Addressing the restrictiveness
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of non-tariff measures in SSA’s trading partners will help not only SSA exporters, but more
importantly, the poorest households in SSA.
It is important to note that a positive value of the index of pro-poor bias only signals
that the existing trade policy is pro-poor, i.e., that the poor benefit relatively more or are
hurt relatively less than the rich by the existing structure of protection. It does not imply
that the poor will be better off. Indeed in some cases, even though there is a strong pro-poor
bias in the existing structure of protection, the welfare of the poor may be lower than in the
absence of trade barriers.
To conclude, Africa’s own trade policy tends to redistribute income from rich to poor
households, and is thus pro-poor. Trade barriers imposed by the rest-of-the-world on SSA’s
export bundle, in particular NTM, tend to redistribute income from poor to rich households,
and are thus pro-rich. What can explain this? An important part of the answer is agricultural
protection, which is high both in SSA and in the rest-of-the-world. High levels of protection in
agriculture in SSA tend to hurt the poor relatively less than the rich because net production of
agricultural goods by poor household is larger than for rich households. At the same time,
higher levels of agricultural protection in the rest-of-the-world tend to be biased against
poor households because they lead to lower agricultural prices which are more costly for
poor households which have a larger net production of agricultural goods. This implies
that the neglect of the agricultural sector by the GATT during many rounds of tariffs
(but more importantly non-tariff) negotiations has had ambiguous effects on SSA’s poor
households/farmers. While better market access, through the current Doha round would
benefit the poor more than the rich in SSA, the simultaneous elimination of own trade
policies may bring smaller gains for the poor, or hurt SSA’s poor relatively more than rich
households.
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Table 1
List of Household Surveys
Sub Saharan Africa
Country Year Survey Households Rural
share
Burkina Faso 2003 ENQUEˆTE BURKINABE SUR LES
CONDITIONS DE VIE DES MENAGES
8500 0.69
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2002 ENQUEˆTE NIVEAU DE VIE ME´NAGES 10801 0.48
Cameroon 2001 DEUXIEME ENQUEˆTE CAMEROUNAISE
AUPRE`S DES ME´NAGES
10992 0.35
Ethiopia 2000 HOUSEHOLD INCOME, CONSUMPTION
AND EXPENDITURE SURVEY
25861 0.67
Gambia 1998 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC SURVEY 2085 0.51
Madagascar 2005 ENQUEˆTE PE´RIODIQUE AUPRE`S DES
ME´NAGES
11781 0.50
Source: World Bank Development Data Platform (DDP) and various Country Statistical Offices.
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Table 5
Income Shares
Bottom 40 % Top 40 %
Country Sales Skilled Unskilled Sales Skilled Unskilled
wages wages wages wages
Burkina Faso 24.1 0.3 26.5 23.6 1.5 28.7
Coˆte d’Ivoire 51.4 1.0 22.9 25.7 9.0 27.6
Cameroon 18.3 2.4 35.3 9.3 19.8 33.7
Ethiopia 14.8 0.6 30.8 17.0 9.8 33.0
Gambia 27.3 0.5 66.4 8.2 4.3 71.2
Madagascar 34.5 1.0 33.9 28.0 8.5 31.6
Source: Author’s calculations based on household survey data.
The category “sales” does not include sales in services or other categories that are not going to be
directly affected by changes in trade policy.
A worker is defined as “skilled” if he has more than 9 years of education.
Table 6
Budget Shares
Bottom 40 Top 40
Country Food Other Food Other
Burkina Faso 38.0 11.5 36.0 19.6
Coˆte d’Ivoire 56.7 19.2 48.8 13.7
Cameroon 53.6 16.0 51.6 18.1
Ethiopia 32.9 13.2 32.1 20.4
Gambia 53.2 17.4 65.4 10.7
Madagascar 45.0 12.6 44.0 11.9
Source: Author’s calculations based on household survey data.
The category “other” does not include auto-consumption or
expenditure in services that are not going to be directly affected
by changes in trade policy.
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Table 10
Index of pro-poor bias in trade policy (tariffs and non-tariff barriers)
Own trade policy Rest-of-the-world trade’s policy
Country Overall Expenditure Sales Wages Overall Sales Wages
Burkina Faso 0.44 0.23 0.32 -0.11 0.67 0.66 0.02
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1.53 -5.04 7.21 -0.64 -6.80 -6.81 0.01
Cameroon 1.08 -0.57 2.26 -0.61 -0.75 -0.78 0.03
Ethiopia -0.48 -0.14 -0.22 -0.12 0.55 0.58 -0.03
Gambia 4.72 1.50 3.46 -0.24 -0.01 -0.07 0.06
Madagascar 0.40 -0.23 0.96 -0.33 -1.33 -1.22 -0.12
Table 11
Index of pro-poor bias in trade policy (tariffs only)
Own trade policy Rest-of-the-world’s trade policy
Country Overall Expenditure Sales Wages Overall Sales Wages
Burkina Faso -0.09 -0.23 0.24 -0.10 0.04 0.04 0.00
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2.20 -1.25 3.71 -0.25 -1.73 -1.73 -0.01
Cameroon 0.58 -0.64 1.81 -0.59 -0.22 -0.23 0.01
Ethiopia -0.43 -0.14 -0.22 -0.08 0.06 0.07 -0.01
Gambia 4.72 1.50 3.46 -0.24 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
Madagascar 0.48 -0.23 0.96 -0.25 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04
Table 12
Robustness checks of the index of pro-poor bias in trade policy for top and bottom 20 and
10 of the income distribution
Own trade policy Rest-of-the-world’s trade policy
Country d = 40 d = 20 d = 10 d = 40 d = 20 d = 10
Burkina Faso 0.44 0.69 0.51 0.67 0.70 0.48
Coˆte d’Ivoire 1.53 0.91 -0.47 -6.80 -9.02 -9.83
Cameroon 1.08 0.96 1.48 -0.75 -0.99 -1.03
Ethiopia -0.48 -0.66 -0.96 0.55 0.60 0.25
Gambia 4.72 6.40 6.61 -0.01 0.05 0.15
Madagascar 0.40 1.05 1.30 -1.33 -2.77 -4.08
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ChangesinSSA’shouseholdwelfarefolowingtheremovalofownandROW’stradebarriers
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